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FOREWORD
This is the final report of the joint U.S./Russian Workshop on Planetary Protection Implemen-
tation for Future Mars Lander Missions that was hosted by NASA Ames Research Center and
convened in July 1992. The format of the workshop included a series of invited talks on topics
relevant to the workshop objectives (see Appendix 2 for a list of topics and presenters), a discussion
session, and the development of conclusions and recommendations. The same format is followed in
this final report.
At the time of the workshop, the Space Studies Board's (SSB) report on biological contami-
nation of Mars was in press. The two main recommendations from that study were known and
discussed at this workshop. Many of the recommendations of this workshop bear directly on
interpretation of that report. No attempt, however, has been made to incorporate into this document
the details of that study, which subsequently became available with the publication of the SSB
report.
Since the time of the workshop, the Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR) Pathf'mder and
MESUR Network mission design concepts have undergone some change. For this report, they are
described as they existed at the time of the workshop. Subsequent changes in those missions have
had no effect on the conclusions reached by this workshop.
It is hoped that the results of this workshop will be useful to planetary protection policy makers
and Mars mission planners in the international community as various space agencies and Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR) finalize planetary protection policy and requirements for future Mars
lander missions.
The final section of this report, Other Topics, includes a brief summary of some of the issues
expected to be important for planning Mars sample return missions. This preliminary discussion was
in preparation for the next joint U.S./Russian workshop, which will be held on the subject of
planetary protection issues and Mars sample return missions.
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ABSTRACT
A workshop was convened to discuss the subject of planetary protection implementation for
Mars lander missions. It was sponsored and organized by the Exobiology Implementation Team of
the U.S./Russian Joint Working Group on Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems. The
objective of the workshop was to discuss planetary protection issues for the Russian Mars '94
mission, which is currently under development, as well as for additional future Mars lander missions
including the planned Mars '96 and U.S. MESUR Pathfinder and Network missions.
A series of invited presentations was made to ensure that workshop participants had access to
information relevant to the planned discussions. The topics summarized in this report include
exobiology science objectives for Mars exploration, current international policy on planetary
protection, planetary protection requirements developed for earlier missions, mission plans and
designs for future U.S. and Russian Mars landers, biological contamination of spacecraft
components, and techniques for spacecraft bioload reduction. In addition, the recent recommen-
dations of the U.S. Space Studies Board (SSB) on this subject were also summarized.
Much of the discussion focused on the recommendations of the SSB. The SSB proposed relaxing
the planetary protection requirements for those Mars lander missions that do not contain life
detection experiments, but maintaining Viking-like requirements for those missions that do contain
life detection experiments. The SSB recommendations were found to be acceptable as a guide for
future missions, although many questions and concerns about interpretation were raised and are
summarized in this report. Significant among the concerns was the need for more quantitative
guidelines to prevent misinterpretation by project offices and better access to and use of the Viking
data base of bioassays to specify microbial burden targets. Among the questions raised were how
will the SSB recommendations be integrated with existing Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR) policy and how will they apply to and affect Mars '94, Mars '96, MESUR Pathfinder,
and MESUR Network missions?
One additional topic briefly considered at the workshop was the identification of some issues
related to planetary protection considerations for Mars sample return missions. These issues will
form the basis for a follow-on joint U.S./Russian workshop on that subject.
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INTRODUCTION
This workshop, entitled Planetary Protection Implementation on Future Mars Lander Missions,
was convened by NASA Ames Research Center and was held in Palo Alto, California, on
July 13-15, 1992.1 It was an official activity of the Exobiology Implementation Team (EIT) of the
U.S./Russian Joint Working Group on Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems. 2 The workshop
was co-chaired by Dr. Donald L. DeVincenzi, Ames Research Center, and Academician Mikhail V.
Ivanov, Russian Academy of Sciences. Workshop participants included leading experts in the field
of planetary protection and individuals and organizations representing an engineering and scientific
cross section of groups affected by planetary protection implementation (see Appendix 1 for a list of
workshop participants).
The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate U.S. and Russian bilateral discussions on
planetary protection implementation for future Mars lander missions. These discussions were not
intended to establish joint policy on, or requirements for, planetary protection, but rather to identify
options available to satisfy Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) recommendations and the
additional research needed to achieve various options. The workshop was timely, considering the
Russian launches for Mars planned for 1994 and 1996 and the U.S. Mars Environmental Survey
(MESUR) Pathfinder mission currently under study. Additionally, this subject becomes increasingly
important as interest in the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) and planning by U.S. and Russian
scientists for robotic Mars life detection and sample return missions continues.
Workshop presentations and discussions were oriented to achieve a common level of scientific
and program knowledge, to summarize the current status of planetary protection implementation
methodology and scientific requirements, and to identify gaps in our knowledge and technology
requiring additional studies.
Although the U.S. Viking missions provided significant experience on implementing planetary
protection requirements, more recent information about the Mars environment and terrestrial biology
warrants a continuing evaluation of planetary protection requirements and implementation method-
ology. Two recent activities along these lines were the NASA Ames Research Center Workshop on
Planetary Protection Issues for the MESUR Mission: Probability of Growth (Pg) (NASA Conference
Publication 3167, H. P. Klein, editor, 1992) and the National Academy of Sciences, Space Studies
Board Report on Biological Contamination of Mars (National Academy Press, 1992).
It was noted that in the past less work was conducted on planetary protection in the former
Soviet Union than in the United States, and in the 1970s planetary protection technology was
developed to a greater degree in the United States. Recently, the situation in Russia has changed
and there is now an increased interest in these issues. This has resulted in various proposals being
developed relating to planetary protection requirements and their implementation on Russian
1Ames Research Center is the NASA lead center for exobiology and home of NASA's Center for Mars Exploration.
Ames also has long-standing involvement and experience in planetary protection policy and implementation.
2In addition to planetary protection activities, the EIT sponsors studies, meetings, and/or research in areas of Earth
orbiting spacecraft useful for exobiology, search for extraterrestrial intelligence, scientist exchanges, joint field work,
joint Mars missions, and Mars exploration sites of interest to exobiology.
missions. The discussions and joint recommendations from this workshop should be useful for the
planning of Russian Mars missions scheduled for launch in 1994 and 1996 and to future COSPAR
deliberations on planetary protection policy.
An additional subject for discussion at the Workshop dealt with the scientific, technological, and
social issues associated with Mars sample return missions. Although there are no concrete plans for
sample return missions in Russia or the United States, it is not too early to start considering
planetary protection issues, since planetary protection measures for sample return missions will
require a greater effort to execute.
A preliminary report of this Workshop was discussed at the EIT meeting held prior to the
COSPAR and World Space Congress meetings in August 1992 in Washington, D.C. Although this
workshop was organized as a bilateral effort, the international flavor of future Mars missions
suggests that future meetings on this subject be multinational in scope.
BACKGROUND
This section contains short summaries of each of the presentations made at the workshop (see
Appendix 2 for list of presenters). The materials used to illustrate the presentations are available
upon request from the authors.
Ancient Life/Chemical Evolution on Mars
The basic biochemical properties of living systems suggest that there is a common ancestry of
life on Earth. This ancestry can be used as a guide for the search for early life forms on Mars.
Comparisons between environmental conditions on early Earth and early Mars show similarities that
are considered to be important for the origin of life on both planets. The search for fossils on Mars is
of particular relevance to planetary protection because it deals with the possibility that life may have
arisen on Mars at some time in the past. Research within the past 15 years supports this possibility.
Comparisons between the environments of early Earth and early Mars were made and it appears that
the early environment on Mars may have been conducive to the origin of life. Evidence was offered
that the factor most important for the timing of the origin and survival of life was impact of
meteorites. Life on Earth may have begun in less than a one-half-billion-year window. It is con-
ceivable that life on Mars may not have required an inordinately long period to develop either and,
consequently, a study of the early history of Mars is exceedingly important.
Key features for site selection on Mars in searching for ancient life were also discussed. Certain
sites were identified as important because they are thought to have had the potential to promote the
development of life and provide a means to preserve fossils. Advantages and disadvantages of
various site types were discussed. For example, evidence was presented that sites possessing some of
the important criteria (e.g., evidence of liquid water in the past) have already been observed on
Mars, and photographic evidence suggests that several other environmental properties important for
the formation of life existed at one time in the planet's history.
Thereareseveraladvantagesto a strategythat focuseson thesearchfor fossil life, including
explorationof thehistoryof Mars and,by extrapolation,of thesolarsystemitself; explorationof an
ancientintervalon theplanetthatmayhavebeenmorefavorablefor theformationof life; enhance-
mentof the sensitivitywith which wemightdetectevidencefor ancientlife; andelucidationof the
origin of life onEarthsinceit maybepossiblethatpreservationof fossil life onMarsmaybe
improvedover thatonEarth.
Extant Life on Mars
Strategies for searching for living organisms on Mars were reviewed and were based on looking
for organic substances in the surface layers of the soil and detecting the presence of heterotrophic
and photoautotrophic microorganisms in the Martian soil in the near-equatorial region where there
might be daily temperatures above freezing and perhaps periods of liquid water. Data from the
Viking mission, however, demonstrated no evidence for these conditions or the presence of life
forms. Furthermore, Viking provided data indicating the presence of environmental conditions that
are not conducive to the presence of life, namely, a high level of ultraviolet (UV) radiation, an
extremely low level of moisture in the atmosphere, the absence of organic substances in the surface
layers, sharp fluctuations in daily temperatures, and the presence of chemically active peroxide
compounds that may be toxic to microorganisms.
Following Viking, some scientists became extremely pessimistic about the possible presence of
extant life on Mars and proposed to focus more attention on past or extinct life forms. However,
several exobiologists remained optimistic and proposed further emphasis on the search for extant
life, particularly in the subsurface soils of Mars, where there might be organic material and protec-
tion from lethal UV radiation. Additionally, organisms could occur in resting forms (e.g., spores) in
or near the polar caps or permafrost of Mars. Antarctic research indicates the existence of photo-
autotrophic, cryptoendolithogenic microorganisms living in conditions that might mimic some
Martian environmental conditions.
Therefore, a new strategy was proposed for the search for microorganisms on Mars that con-
centrates on searching for aerobic and anaerobic chemolithoautotrophic bacteria. This strategy is
recommended because these organisms do not need a readily available source of organic material
but can fix carbon dioxide as their only source of carbon.
It was recommended that primary mission landing site selection should concentrate on areas on
Mars that indicate possible residual hydrothermal activity and where flows of reduced gases, water
vapor, and other critical elements from the interior may exist. Although no such sites on Mars have
been identified to date, the search for these sites should be a focus of future missions. Studies at such
sites should include both surface and subsurface properties. Experiments should include measure-
ments of pH and Eh and isotopic evaluations of sulfur, carbon, and hydrogen. Recent geochemical
literature was cited that provides evidence that is consistent with the existence on Mars of subsurface
environments favorable for possible anaerobic chemolithoautotrophic microorganisms. Meteorite
analyses and laboratory experimentation were also presented to support the theory that environ-
mental conditions or sites exist on Mars which are capable of supporting the presence of metabolic
processes similar to those used by chemolithoautotrophic microorganisms.
Existing NASAJCOSPAR Planetary Protection Policy
The current basic statement of planetary protection policy adopted by NASA is formulated to
preserve science; meet signatory treaty agreements on the protection of planets, including the Earth,
from potential hazards; and protect the planets by imposing controls on potential contamination
carried by space vehicles. The NASA policy is contained in NASA Management Instruction (NMI)
8020.7C. The policy applies to all missions to the planets and return missions to Earth; however, the
actual controls imposed on a given mission are based on the mission objective, the target planet
under investigation, the current knowledge base existing at the time of launch, and recommendations
from scientific groups such as the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Academy of Science
(NAS). U.S. planetary protection policies, procedures, regulations, and guidelines are prescribed by
NASA's Planetary Protection Officer (PPO). Additionally, the PPO is responsible for certifying
compliance with the established policies and guidelines, and individual projects are compelled to
demonstrate compliance with this policy.
Current NASA and COSPAR policies, which were developed in 1984 (D. L. DeVincenzi and
P. D. Stabekis: Revised Planetary Protection Policy for Solar System Exploration. Adv. Space Res.,
vol. 4, no. 12, 1984, pp. 291-295), divide mission/target planet combinations into five categories.
Category I applies to planets where planetary protection is not required. Category II applies to
planets where there is no concern about biological contamination per se, but where there is a desire
to minimize organic contamination and its impact on future understanding of exobiological data.
Category HI applies to planets where contamination concerns exist, but there is no mission require-
ment for the spacecraft to contact the planet. Category IV is the same as Category HI with the
exception that the mission is designed for spacecraft to come in contact with the planet. (A mission
designed to land a spacecraft on the surface of Mars would be a Category IV mission. Because of
biological interest in Mars, a Category IV classification would apply even if there were no concern
about terrestrial life growing on Mars. It should be noted, however, that the implementation tech-
niques might be modified.). Category V applies to sample return missions from another planet to
Earth. Therefore, the constraints applied to a specific mission depend greatly on the type and
destination of the mission and become increasingly more rigorous for higher category missions.
The Magellan and Galileo missions have used this planetary protection approach. Both were
classified as Category II missions. These missions required or will develop and submit pre- and post-
launch documentation and reports at the completion of the mission on the fate of the spacecraft.
Planetary protection guidelines for Mars Observer are described in a later section of this report.
Space Studies Board Recommendations
A recent study conducted by the SSB of the NAS at the request of NASA Headquarters was
discussed. The final report was published after this workshop was held (see reference on page 1).
The starting point for the SSB study was the 1978 Space Science Board's reevaluation of
planetary protection policy and state of knowledge of planetary properties. The recent study focused
only on forward contamination. No efforts were spent on addressing back contamination issues. The
SSB did not attempt to assign a mathematical value to the probability of growth of a terrestrial
organismonMars.However,thestudygroupbelievedthatthe likelihood of aterrestrialorganism
growing onMars isextremelyremoteandthat assigninga valueseemedmeaningless.
TheSSBreport recommends that landers carrying instrumentation for in situ investigation of
extant life should be subjected to at least Viking-like bioload reduction procedures. They recom-
mended that sterilization technology developments over the past 15 years be evaluated for their
applicability to spacecraft. The SSB stated that landers and orbiters without biological experiments
should be subjected to special cleaning and assembly procedures, and bioload levels should be
reduced to a level equal to or less than the bioload level for Viking prior to terminal dry heat
treatment. They further noted, however, that the nature of the instrumentation and the properties of
the sites to be explored should play a part in the burden reduction requirements. Microbial detection
techniques have improved since Viking and the recommendation was made that procedures should
be evaluated for their applicability to burden assessment on a spacecraft.
In the ensuing discussion, various interpretations of the SSB's recommendations were offered.
Several participants noted the absence of quantitative targets in the recommendations and were
concerned that insufficient definition would make it more difficult to identify the procedures needed
for implementation. Others felt that the use of the terms "Viking" or "Viking-like" implied a
quantitative level. Several participants suggested that the term "life detection experiments" be
def'med and asked if the recommendation implied that vehicles containing instrumentation looking
for elements associated with life would also require bioload reduction. The SSB report contains a
much more detailed description of the recommendations and also contains the data and references
that were used to substantiate the recommendations.
Planetary Protection Implementation for Viking Orbiters
The objectives of the Viking mission were reviewed. A graphic representation of the mission
profile, Viking Orbiter (VO), and Viking Lander (VL) was shown, and the steps taken to achieve
planetary protection requirements were identified. COSPAR recommendations and NASA
constraints imposed on Viking were presented in detail and accompanied by a summary of the
probabilistic approach used to establish compliance with the imposed constraints. For the VO, these
constraints translated into cleanroom assembly, biological burden limitations at launch, trajectory
biasing requirements, and orbit lifetime constraints. Implementation technology was discussed in
detail.
Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars Observer
Mars Observer (MO) is the first mission to Mars since Viking. Therefore, it is the first Mars
mission required to comply with the 1984 planetary protection policy revisions. In arriving at the
appropriate categorization for the mission, NASA requested that the SSB review the mission and
mission objectives and make appropriate recommendations. After a thorough review, the SSB
recommended the MO mission be designated as a Category III mission. The SSB further recom-
mended that the MO project implement cleanroom assembly (Class 100,000), bias the injection
aim point of the spacecraft to assure a probability of <10 -5 of impact of the launch vehicle and a
probability of <10-4 of impact of the spacecraft, select a mapping orbit such that the probability of
remaining in orbit until the year 2009 is >0.9999, and raise the orbit sufficiently upon completion of
the nominal mission to ensure that the probability of stable orbit is >0.95 until the year 2039.
These recommendations were adopted by NASA and imposed on the MO project. The project
converted these constraints into project requirements and determined the appropriate mission designs
required to achieve the requirements. The formalized implementation plans were documented in a
planetary protection plan approved by NASA's PPO. Selected data were presented to the workshop,
from an MO project briefing held on May 19, 1992, which demonstrated compliance of the mission.
In summary, the project indicated the probability of impact of the launch vehicle is <10 -5 , the
probability of the spacecraft impacting Mars before 2009 is 4.4 x 10 -5, and the probability of impact
between the year of 2009 and 2039 is 8 x 10- 3. These conditions are achieved by controlling the
periapsis altitude to >325 km. It was also noted that both contractor and launch site facilities used for
assembly and test activities employ Class 100,000 cleanrooms. So, all imposed planetary protection
requirements were implemented and the SSB recommendations were achieved.
During the discussion, questions were raised regarding the validity of comparing MO planetary
protection requirements with those for the VO. The controls were qualitatively the same, but actual
specifications were mission specific and consequently differed quantitatively. It was also noted that
the orbit lifetime requirements for MO were extended beyond those imposed on Viking. Additional
discussions were related to how much of the vehicle would be assembled in a cleanroom environ-
ment and whether such requirements apply to the components, the total vehicle, or both. Although
there might be some components or subassemblies exposed to levels exceeding Class 100,000, most
electronic and spacecraft assembly and test facilities used in the U.S. aerospace business were equal
to or better than Class 100,000.
Planetary Protection for Viking Landers
The planetary protection measures implemented for the VL were summarized. This included the
analyses that dictated the requirement for bioload reduction and protection against recontamination.
Implementation procedures used to achieve the required levels of bioload reduction were presented
along with several of the technical parameters provided to the Viking Project (VP) by NASA. These
parameters were needed for calculating the duration and temperature exposure for component and
vehicle heating.
The thermal models, test vehicles, analyses, and temperature regimes were also presented in
some detail. This was followed by a description of the actual terminal heating process used for the
two VLs and a detailed summary of recontamination prevention measures that were implemented.
Also presented was the calculated probability of contamination for each Viking lander that demon-
strated consistency with the planetary protection requirements and constraints imposed on the VP.
The measures implemented to achieve planetary protection mission requirements included lander
cleanroom assembly, surface cleaning to reduce burden levels, bioassay of the vehicles, bioload
reduction of the landers using dry heat, lander recontamination prevention including encapsulation
in a bioshield, monitoring of burden levels on the VO and nose fairing, trajectory biasing of the
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launchvehicleandspacecraftincludingdeflectionof thelaunchvehicle,andminimumaltitude
requirementsfor theVO andbioshieldbase,aswell asmanyothers.
MESUR Pathfinder Mission Design and Planetary Protection Issues
The concept for the 1996 MESUR Pathfinder mission, including a description of the estimated
project costs, planned launch date, science payload, and other mission objectives, was presented.
The Pathf'mder mission would be a single spacecraft launched on a Delta II vehicle in late 1996,
with arrival at Mars in November 1997. The mission is planned as a direct entry into the Martian
atmosphere from a hyperbolic transfer orbit. A mid-latitude low elevation landing site is most
probable. Communication with Earth is planned to take place by direct link with no orbiter intercept.
Spacecraft power is currently envisioned as being derived from solar energy. Surface operation on
the planet would include deployment of various instruments and collection of key scientific and
engineering data. The objectives of the mission are to test the entry, descent, and landing methods;
survival of the lander system over several day-night cycles; instrument deployment; and to
determine the ability to launch a successful low cost mission.
It is planned that the MESUR Pathfinder mission will be followed by a MESUR Network
proposed to start in FY 1996. The objective of this mission is to establish a global network of
stations on Mars to concurrently collect and return scientific data over a minimum of one Martian
year. Project planners view this type of mission as a logical evolutionary step following the Viking
mission and as a precursor to sample return and/or human exploration. MESUR, as envisioned at the
time of this workshop, would include up to 16 stations providing pole to pole coverage of the planet
and incorporating a variety of scientific instrumentation. This network of landers would be launched
on Delta vehicles in groups of four between 1999 and 2003. Communication would be accomplished
using a relay orbiter.
Preliminary design concepts for the MESUR mission were described. Included was an option
that involved a rover vehicle of approximately 9 kg. A tetrahedron lander configuration was
presented as one potential "hard" lander concept. It was noted that the tetrahedron concept was
previously conceived and tested in Russia. Entry and descent options and an entry prof'de were
shown, including a description of the associated engineering factors.
Finally, some planetary protection working assumptions for the MESUR Pathfinder and Network
missions were presented. These included the assumption that bioload reduction by dry heat would
not be required. It was noted that project cost estimates are predicated on using "off-the-shelf"
equipment and it is unlikely that such equipment could survive the required heating to temperatures
comparable to the Viking procedures. Other assumptions were that no bioshield would be required,
cleanroom assembly would be used, and dry heat treatment of selected components may be needed
to meet planetary protection requirements. Concerns were expressed about the mechanisms and
techniques required to provide analyses to demonstrate compliance with planetary protection
constraints.
The discussion period included questions about why the MESUR mission strawman payload did
not include life detection or biological experiments. The consensus was that Viking data indicated
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that additionalenvironmentaldatawereneededto properlydesignsuchanexperimentandthatthe
MESURmissions,in combinationwith theRussianMars 1994and1996missions,wouldgather
muchof theneededinformation.Muchdiscussioncenteredaroundtheneedfor samplereturn
missions.It wasdecidedthatsamplereturnmissionswouldprobablybe requiredto conductthe
critical experiments.
Planetary Protection Options for MESUR
This study was performed in support of the MESUR Phase A effort at Ames Research Center in
1991. The objective was to analyze how MESUR could achieve Viking cleanliness levels, should
those be imposed on the mission for whatever reason. This study was conducted before the NAS
issued its recommendations of reduced requirements for Mars landers without life detection
experiments.
The study was divided into three phases. The first evaluated the impact of imposing Viking-like
requirements on MESUR, the second evaluated bioload reduction technology developed since
Viking and the applicability of new techniques to spacecraft decontamination, and the third assessed
various other options that could be applied to MESUR to achieve planetary protection requirements.
The third phase of these efforts was the subject of this presentation.
Using Viking criteria and constraints as a baseline, it was demonstrated that MESUR would
require both component and total vehicle bioload reduction to reach required levels of cleanliness.
Although the analysis indicated that the level of decontamination for MESUR would be less severe
than for Viking, this alone would not provide significant cost savings. It was also determined that the
proposed reductions in values for probability of growth on Mars (Pg), which had been recommended
by other studies (see reference on page 1), afforded little benefit in achieving Viking-like cleanliness
requirements. Mission designers wishing to maintain maximum flexibility would be forced to use
the most conservative Pg value (10-7). This, in turn, would require that the vehicle and components
be subjected to bioload reduction by dry heat to meet Viking-like cleanliness requirements.
Studies were presented that evaluated the influence of selective component decontamination
procedures combined with aggressive cleaning. Study results concluded that although the level of
cleanliness achieved for Viking could not be achieved, significant bioload reduction could be
accomplished in this way.
In summary, the study determined that if achieving Viking cleanliness standards was required,
then the MESUR vehicles would have to be subjected to dry heat bioload reduction to achieve a
comparable level of cleanliness. The study further concluded that cleaning and selective decon-
tamination of spacecraft components reduced vehicle bioload, but that the reduction was insufficient
to meet Viking-like contamination constraints. It was recommended that detailed implementation
techniques to achieve planetary protection constraints remain as project responsibilities and that
continued efforts be expended to further evaluate burden assessment and reduction technology.
Microbes and Spacecraft Components
This session centered on organisms isolated and identified from various spacecraft materials. The
quantity and type of organisms reflected the type of material tested. The results of these studies can
be used to identify the susceptibility of materials to microbial contamination. Knowledge of these
material properties should allow specification of the appropriate decontamination techniques and
selection of those materials tailored to specific bioload reduction techniques.
Cultivation procedures for isolating organisms from spacecraft materials were conducted under
various conditions using a simulated Martian environment. A detailed summary of the findings was
presented, which showed the types and quantities of bacteria and fungi isolated. A few of the
isolated organisms grew under anaerobic conditions. Bacillus polymyxa was isolated from a large
percentage of the materials, and this organism was capable of growing under anaerobic conditions.
Organisms capable of growing under anaerobic conditions were of the most concern for potential
growth and contamination on Mars. It was also noted that viable but nonculturable organisms were
probably present.
Survey of Past Bioload Reduction Technology
The methods and concepts for bioload reduction developed by NASA during the years before
Viking were described. Implementation of spacecraft bioload reduction techniques began in the
1960s with the attempted decontamination of Lunar spacecraft. These early attempts were
unsuccessful because of extensive hardware and equipment failures. These failures ultimately led
to major research programs evaluating bioload reduction and decontamination technology and
development of techniques for application to spacecraft. Processes evaluated included dry and wet
heat treatment, radiation, gaseous exposure, and chemical disinfection. An evaluation of processes
other than dry heat was presented, which showed specific advantages and disadvantages associated
with each. These processes included radiation, thermoradiation, gaseous exposure, chemical
disinfection, and self-decontaminating coatings and encapsulates. These studies ultimately led to
the selection and refinement of the dry heat treatment process for Viking.
Also presented was a detailed analysis of the development of parameters for the application of
dry heat to Viking. This included selection of a standard test organism; definition of burden
categories of surfaces, mated and encapsulated, and their respective resistance to dry heat exposure;
influence of humidity on the efficacy of the process; and thermal death rate models. These factors
were necessary for implementation of the process on Viking.
Bioload Reduction Technology for Landers
Bioload reduction technology consistent with previous COSPAR requirements has been under
study in Russia. These studies confirmed previous concerns by others that microbial detection
technology needs improvement. The study indicated that sonication of samples or spacecraft parts
could affect the detected level of contamination by as much as a factor of two. Data were presented
on potential contamination levels contained on or in the surface and subsurface of a variety of
materials.Thestudiesshowedthatheatandradiationtreatmentsappearedto be themostappropriate
methodsfor spacecraftbioloadreduction.Datawerepresentedthat impliedthatchemicaldecon-
taminationmaybeappropriatefor useonly onspecificspacecraftcomponents.Thesamelimitations
applied to gaseous decontamination techniques.
Various bioload reduction approaches including use of ultraviolet light, ethylene oxide, etc.,
were evaluated. The attractiveness of gaseous exposure was one of the motivating factors for studies
to develop a combined process for spacecraft bioload reduction. The combined process selected for
study and development was exposure of the spacecraft to a radioactive gas which could be imple-
mented after launch of the vehicle. This technological approach provides the advantage that because
the process was implemented after launch, the problems associated with recontamination were
minimized or eliminated.
Data were presented on the radiation inactivation characteristics of several microorganisms
isolated from several Russian spacecraft sources; several radiation resistant organisms were found.
Findings indicate that radiation resistance can vary from one to ten percent of the total population.
Radiation compatibility studies of many different materials, including various electronic parts and
components, were discussed.
Finally, the application of this technology to the Russian 1994 and 1996 missions and advan-
tages of its proposed use were discussed. Also included was a discussion of how this process is used
to meet the COSPAR policy requirements. Data were presented on the efficacy of the process;
however, the exact composition of the gas and the type of radiation were not identified because of
industrial confidentiality. Lengthy discussions followed relating to electronic parts and materials
compatibility and potential problems associated with the launch of radioactive gas.
Russian Mars 1994 and 1996 Missions and Planetary Protection Hardware
The Mars '94 mission consists of two small landers and two penetrators. The penetrators and
landers are launched from Mars orbit and their trajectories and performance are controlled
independently.
The scientific objectives of the penetrators are to collect television images of the Martian
surface, meteorological data, chemical composition and water content of the soil, seismic activity,
and physical and mechanical characteristics of the Martian regolith, and to determine magnetic
properties. In addition, the two small lander stations will collect additional data complementing that
collected by the penetrators.
A general scheme for the inflight bioload reduction technique was presented. Specific hardware
configuration and operations were discussed, including a schematic showing gas penetration into the
landers and penetrators and removal of the gas foUowing exposure. Hardware that cannot withstand
exposure to the decontaminating radioactive gas (i.e., parachute, critical electronic parts, etc.) will be
cleaned by other methods before incorporation into and launch of the vehicle.
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For Mars '96, the bioload reduction process to be used would be essentially identical to that
described for Mars '94. One major difference between the missions is the presence of a large balloon
on Mars '96 to be launched from the spacecraft during entry. The size, complexity, and fragility of
the balloon probe requires development and application of special cleaning procedures. Detailed
explanations of this process were presented. Additionally, the Mars '96 mission will contain a small
rover that requires special attention to bioload reduction techniques.
Several of the critical hardware elements and materials for the missions were not completely
compatible with the proposed radioactive gaseous decontamination process, and development work
was continuing. The final procedures may include individual decontamination of certain components
with protection against recontamination, whereas other components may require enclosure in airtight
containers.
Bioload Reduction Techniques for Mars 1994 and 1996
The classical probabilistic approach to planetary protection was applied to the balloon project
for the Russian Mars '96 mission. The calculated requirements were translated into the bioload
reduction needed for the balloon to meet the required bioload levels at launch. Additionally,
materials and system compatibility of the balloon components were addressed. In summary, it was
concluded that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the required levels of cleanliness
using the radioactive gas proposed for the 1994 and 1996 spacecraft. More favorable results
appeared to be achieved for the balloon using gamma radiation. Under these conditions, the balloon
would be housed in a sealed container and irradiated for a period sufficient to reduce the bioload to
the required level. It was noted, however, that the gondola and other balloon components were not
compatible with gamma radiation, and an alternate approach using hydrogen peroxide was evaluated
for decontaminating these components.
Data were presented on results of testing of balloon materials compatibility with the proposed
radiation and hydrogen peroxide process. Considerable work still remains to resolve bioload
reduction issues for the balloon. This includes further refinement of the process focusing on addi-
tional materials compatibility studies and decontamination assurance to demonstrate compliance
with planetary protection criteria. Particular concern was expressed, however, that the development
of new processes and procedures may not be timely enough for use on the 1994 and 1996 missions.
DISCUSSION
The discussion focused on reviewing the SSB recommendations that landers carrying life
detection instrumentation achieve at least the Viking levels of bioload reduction, and that landers
not carrying life detection experiments achieve at least Viking pre-heat-treatment bioload levels.
Although the workshop and its participants were not in a position of creating or formulating policy
and requirements, it could make recommendations related to policy, technology, missions, etc.
Therefore, the group discussed and expanded on the SSB recommendations in preparation for these
recommendations being considered for incorporation into international policy.
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Until theSSB'srecommendationsweredisseminated,Mars landers were considered Category
IV missions and all planetary protection evaluations, including those for MESUR and Mars '94
and '96, have assumed application of the constraints associated with this classification. Given the
SSB recommendation, a scenario was visualized that could conceivably be adopted by COSPAR as
policy for the future. It could be proposed that the policy be modified to include two groups under
Category IV: Category IV-A, which would impose bioload reduction requirements like Viking's up
to terminal heat treatment on missions without life detection experiments; and Category IV-B, which
would impose full Viking bioload reduction requirements on missions that have landers with life
detection experiments.
With regard to the concern that the SSB recommendations were not quantitative, it was noted
that the term Viking-like bioload reduction referred to a known microbial load and, consequently,
the statement in itself indicates a quantitative level of decontamination. That is, the bioload levels to
be met are the number of organisms on the Viking spacecraft, either immediately before or just after
terminal dry heat treatment. However, it was also felt that the term Viking-like implied the use of the
classical probabilistic approach to planetary protection. This suggested the use of caution in interpre-
tation of the term Viking-like and that, with currently accepted low values for Pg, it is conceivable
this type of statement could result in overkill. On the other hand, the recommendations made by the
SSB do not require the use of a Pg value. In stating Viking-like, a given level of cleanliness (e.g.,
number of organisms per unit area of spacecraft) is implied that is independent of a Pg calculation.
The concern that spacecraft engineers need something more quantitative than the statements
proposed by the SSB continued to be debated. It was felt that the recommendations fell short of
providing or identifying methods for cleaning, and, consequently, the statements made about
requirements would be better understood if quantitative goals were provided rather than specifying
qualitative requirements such as cleanroom assembly, etc. The SSB, however, resisted developing
recommendations based on the classical mathematical approach. The starting point used for the most
recent study was the 1978 SSB report that was accepted by COSPAR, and the present SSB repres-
entatives saw no need to modify the findings of that report. If quantitation was needed, the values
used in that 1978 report were deemed acceptable; however, although the current SSB members felt
that the value for Pg was extremely small and maybe even less than stated in the 1978 report, they
resisted placing a new value on Pg.
Discussions also focused on the implication that the SSB recommendations indicate that it is
acceptable to land a "dirty" spacecraft on Mars if no life detection experiment is on board. The
SSB considered the probability of growth of a terrestrial organism on Mars to be extremely small.
Therefore, it follows that the concern about depositing organisms on the planet is very small;
however, we should be concerned about the possibility of such organisms contaminating a life
detection experiment that might be carded on future spacecraft. Further, the properties of the landing
site should also be considered when determining the number of organisms allowed on a vehicle
and/or the level of contamination deposited on the planet. A mission-by-mission analysis may be
required to answer that question. Clearly, the SSB report shifted emphasis away from protection of
the planet and more toward protection of science.
The SSB also considered the possible distribution of microbial contamination on Mars by winds
and other environmental factors. The consensus was that, given the harsh environmental conditions
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thatexistonMars,the likelihoodof anorganismbeingredepositedata morefavorablesitein a
viablestatewasconsideredvery remote. However, this represents an area where more study and/or
modeling may be required.
Because the probability of growth of terrestrial microbes on Mars is small, why is there a need to
impose any requirements at all on a vehicle that does not carry life detection experiments? This is
important because although the requirements may be less severe than those imposed on life detection
missions, they are not insignificant and could have considerable cost impact. In this regard, although
the SSB believes the Pg to be very small, they do not state that the value is zero. Furthermore,
scientists are also concerned about organic as well as microbial contamination of the planet, and
controls must be imposed to ensure the integrity of scientific studies. For these reasons, some level
of cleaning is required on vehicles that do not carry life detection experiments.
If landing site properties could have some effect on planetary protection requirements, then a
mission such as MESUR or Mars '96, with capability for landing at multiple sites, would have to
impose the strictest cleanliness controls because the project would want to maintain maximum
flexibility to target specific landing sites. Clearly, this is another area needing further study. Even the
1978 SSB report was somewhat site dependent in that it specified a range of Pg values depending on
where on the planet a spacecraft might be sent.
The data from the Viking experiments cannot be used to shed light on the likelihood that
terrestrial organisms will grow on Mars. Therefore, although it is a radical and controversial idea,
the suggestion was made that it might be scientifically interesting to deliberately contaminate Mars
with a known organism. This would allow scientists to evaluate the probability of growth on Mars
by looking for the presence of that organism with life detection experiments. It was suggested that
such an idea would be worth discussing in more detail at a future meeting. It could also be expanded
to include depositing and then measuring survival of chemical and biological marker molecules as
well.
Another suggestion offered was that spacecraft components coming in direct contact with the
surface of Mars be decontaminated. This would include parachutes, aeroshells, lander pads, etc.
Electronic components or items in protective containers would not require such treatment since they
are constructed in a highly controlled environment and would have greatly reduced bioloads.
Components that could be eroded in the Mars environment should also be subjected to bioload
reduction. Further, if a vehicle crash lands on the planet, that particular landing site should be
excluded from future exobiological exploration because of the potential release of buried microbial
contamination, which could then become detectable on a future life detection mission. Others
viewed such a recommendation to be much more stringent than the SSB intended for landers not
carrying life detection experiments. However, concern about transportation of contamination to other
sites on Mars is valid and certainly warrants further study. In addition, if a project wished to impose
requirements that were more stringent than the proposed guidelines, there was nothing to preclude
such an action. However, it is unlikely that missions without life detection would require these
additional bioload reductions.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the presentations and general discussion, several conclusions and recommendations
were developed. They are summarized as follows:
I. The SSB recommendations were acceptable in principle and should be ratified. In addition,
some suggestions were offered as qualifications to the SSB report. For example, there was wide-
spread agreement that the SSB recommendations need to be made as quantitative as practical in
order to prevent misinterpretation by various projects, and that the source information used for this
quantitation should be the Viking database. Also, the SSB recommendations need to be related to,
and integrated with, existing COSPAR policy and ultimately adopted by COSPAR.
2. The SSB recommendations appear to shift the emphasis of planetary protection away from
concerns about contaminating the planet to protection of exobiological science to be done on future
missions. There was concern expressed that this apparent shift of emphasis could result in a biasing
away from experiments and sites of exobiological interest; however, there was no recommendation
on how to address this issue. This apparent shift further blurs the line delineating planetary protec-
tion from exobiological science. As an example, the planetary protection requirements for Viking
were not as stringent as the science requirements, but the science requirements are often cited as the
planetary protection requirements.
3. The adoption of the proposed SSB recommendations would provide significant relief to
planetary protection implementation on the Mars '94 and MESUR Pathfinder missions. However, it
was recognized that even these relaxed requirements will still impose some incremental impact on
mission complexity and costs. There was also some concern that how the recommendations were
interpreted could potentially result in increased complexity for the Mars '96 and MESUR Network
missions depending on such things as how life detection instrumentation is defined, and in view of
multiple landing sites planned for multiple landers (MESUR) and balloons (Mars '96). These and
other considerations may require more detailed interpretation of the SSB recommendations.
4. A better definition of what constitutes a life detection instrument is clearly needed.
Exobiology experiments for Mars missions could range from the detection of organics to the
detection of extant and extinct life forms. However, it is unlikely that all such experiments would
be considered life detection and consequently require the level of cleanliness achieved on Viking
following dry heat treatment. Only experiments designed to detect extant life might require that
more stringent controls be placed on the mission.
5. For landers without life detection experiments, it was recommended that the Viking
cleanliness standards (bioloads) be clearly defined and used as the quantitative baseline for that
type of mission. There was agreement that the qualitative recommendations given by the SSB were
acceptable as guidelines for planning. These included such items as the requirements for impact
prevention for orbiters and launch vehicles, cleanroom assembly, bioload reduction, bioload
assessment, chemical inventory, etc. The SSB recommendations do provide increased flexibility for
the projects to achieve planetary protection requirements, and there was strong consensus that the
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exactmethodologyfor achievingtheserequirements houldresidewith theagenciesandprojects
responsiblefor themissions.
6. For landerswith life detection experiments, there was a parallel set of recommendations.
These included a definition of the Viking standards for use by the projects, including the techniques
needed to achieve the required level of bioload reduction. A proposal was made for future missions
that the planetary protection constraints and requirements should be driven by the science payload.
Additionally, an idea was expressed that only organisms on the surface of the vehicles should be
considered, but not those that might be huffed or trapped between mated surfaces on the vehicle.
There was also consensus that the qualitative guidelines for missions with life detection instruments
were appropriate as specified by the SSB and, as for missions without life detection, that the imple-
mentation procedures and processes should remain the prerogative of the projects and agencies
responsible.
7. More attention should be placed on the probability of organic contamination of the planet
and its impact on exobiology studies.
8. There was concern that the SSB recommendations could result in the launch of vehicles with
a higher level of contamination and that this could potentially jeopardize sites for future exobio-
logical studies. It was suggested that sites where a spacecraft has accidentally impacted the planet be
eliminated from future exobiology studies. It was also recommended that some mechanism be
established to evaluate various sites of particular interest for exobiology and develop specific
protection measures for them. Finally, it was recommended that the Mars '94 mission be exploited
for the purpose of locating sites optimized for exobiological exploration with future missions.
9. The various planetary protection parameters used in project implementations needed review
and reevaluation in light of the SSB' s recommendations. For example, if the term Viking-like is to
be used, then many of the parameters upon which Viking requirements were based may need further
evaluation and def'mition.
10. It was recommended that the SSB recommendations be applied to a real mission so that
actual requirements and implementation scenarios could be proposed and costed to assess their true
impact on the project.
11. The planetary protection requirements presented for Mars Observer were acceptable as the
standard for planetary protection requirements for future Mars orbiters.
12. There is a potential for very different interpretations of the SSB's recommendations. To
some, the term Viking-like could imply use of the probabilistic approach used on Viking. To others,
it can imply an identifiable and quantifiable bioload level; namely, the Viking levels, pre- and post-
dry heat treatment. In the latter case, the levels of microbial contamination before and after dry heat
treatment of Viking are known and documented, including the procedures used to achieve those
levels.
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13. SincetheSSBfelt thattheprobabilityof aterrestrialmicroorganismgrowingonMarswas
extremelysmall,butnot zero,it is appropriatethatforwardcontaminationconcernsandrequire-
mentsfor vehicleswithout life detectionexperimentsbereduced,butnot eliminatedentirely.
14. Considerablestudywill beneededto interpretandderivespecificrequirementsfrom the
SSB'srecommendations.Identifying therequirementsto thatlevelof detailwasbeyondthescopeof
thisworkshop.
15. TheSSBrecommendationsmustbe includedwithin theagreementsformulatedby COSPAR
onbehalfof the internationalcommunity.In themeantime,furtherevaluationof theconceptof
bioloadreductiononspacecraftwouldappearwarranted.Becauseof differencesin bioloadassess-
menttechniquesfrom countryto country,it wouldseemappropriatein theneartermto expand
effortsondevelopinguniform detectionandassessmentmethodologyandstandards.It was
suggestedthatsuchstudiescouldbeconductedthroughjoint RussianandU.S.activitiesand
incorporatebothU.S.andRussianspacecraftdataaswell ascurrentknowledgeonbioload
assessment.
OTHER TOPICS
An additional topic for this workshop was the identification and discussion of planetary
protection issues of importance for a Mars sample return mission. This session was intended to
produce topics for the next in the ongoing series of U.S./Russian workshops on planetary protection,
namely, a workshop on planetary protection and Mars sample return missions.
Mars Sample Return Scientific/Technology Issues
The question of indigenous life on Mars drives the entire issue of back contamination. Before the
Mariner missions to Mars, there was a different perception of the likelihood of life on Mars than
exists today. It was believed that Mars had water ice at the poles, an atmosphere of 85 millibars
making possible liquid water, and a wave of darkening associated with vegetation. Following the
Mariner and Viking missions, the potential for extant life on Mars was viewed as being quite remote.
If there is extant life on Mars, it would likely be confined to specific environmental niches. In
addition, it would be specifically adapted to these environmental niches and, in the absence of such
niches, may not pose a threat to our biosphere. However, prudence dictates that should the
opportunity exist to return samples, certain precautions and controls should be imposed.
At a meeting of the Committee on Planetary Biology and Chemical Evolution of the SSB, a
question was posed regarding the potential hazards of a returned Mars sample. There was a
consensus that for all practical purposes there was no chance that a Martian organism would pose a
threat to the Earth's biosphere. However, when asked if it would be acceptable to return samples
without planetary protection measures, there was again virtually complete agreement that it would
be prudent that such measures be required for sample return missions.
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ExistingCOSPARsamplereturnpolicy wasreviewedanddiscussedandsomeextensionsto
theseguidelinesweresuggested.Theseextensionsincludedbioloadreductionfor anyspacecraft
componenthatwouldencounterthesurfaceof Mars,enclosureof thespacecraftin abioshield
during launchandcruise,collectionandcontainmentof samplesat ambient(Mars)conditions,
breakingthechainof contactwith theMarssurface,andanalysisof returnedsamplesin acontain-
mentfacility on Earth(D. L. DeVincenziandH. P.Klein: PlanetaryProtectionIssuesfor Sample
ReturnMissions.Adv. SpaceRes.,vol. 9, no.6, 1989,pp.203-206).
Considerablecommunicationwith andeducationof thegeneralpublicwouldneedto accompany
sucha mission.This missionwill becomplicatedby thewell-known failedattemptsatcontainment
duringtheApollo program,whichcanbeusedasanexampleof thepotentialhazardassociatedwith
samplereturnmissions.
SampleReturn Nonscientific Issues
Although the nonscientific issues may appear insignificant in the overall mission context, they
can become a significant mission impediment if improperly handled. If space agencies fail to deal
with social issues early in mission planning phases, it may increase the likelihood of public oppo-
sition, cost increases, and other obstacles to successful mission completion. Past experiences of the
space program have been examined with the objective of identifying and prioritizing what consid-
erations and requirements should be incorporated in mission planning activities so that forward
looking recommendations can be developed for future sample return missions. It is a fact that
planetary protection means something quite different to the engineers and scientists than to the
general public.
Many data exist on planetary protection techniques to minimize forward contamination, although
there is still considerable discussion of the methods needed to achieve the requirements. The public
is generally uninvolved or uninterested in these debates, but this will not be the case with back
contamination.
It is predicted that the level of public concern that might exist with back contamination issues
will be significant. The prediction is based on the public's response to such issues as genetically
engineered microorganisms, nuclear power, food irradiation, and various industrial processes such as
mass incinerators. Public response to these issues suggests that public vigilance about risk will likely
remain the same or increase. This appears to be particularly true for health and environmental issues.
It is also conceivable that programs could be delayed or canceled based on issues totally
unrelated to the objective of the mission in question. One recent example of such an action was the
attempt to delay the Galileo mission launch, not because of opposition to the mission, but because of
an objection to radioactive materials being launched into space. Additionally, there has been a
migration away from the more scientific and technical decision-making processes of the past, and an
increased emphasis on the social decision-making process. This movement will force more attention
on the social issues of spaceflight and less on the technical and analytical attributes of a mission. It is
highly possible that such social elements could alter the course of a mission even to the extent of
cancellation.
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Samplereturnmissionspossesseveryelementof theworstcasescenariofor socialdebate.When
comparedwith somerecentsocialchallenges,suchasgeneticengineering, sample return missions
offer a far greater opportunity for social involvement. A sample return mission extends far beyond
local concerns and can quickly become an issue of international concern. Insufficient planning will
likely impose significant delays and could easily force cancellation of a mission.
A variety of domestic and international laws and treaties governing the control of both forward
and back contamination were also discussed. A brief explanation of each law and treaty was pro-
vided. It was pointed out that the National Environmental Policy Act ensures that information is
made available to the public before program implementation.
There are many legal issues, research and development programs, management issues, and
understanding of mission architecture and parameters that must be addressed soon, and appropriate
funding must be provided to initiate these studies.
Topics for Sample Return Workshop
Following the presentations, a brief discussion period took place. In addition to the scientific and
nonscientific considerations posed above, three other topics were also suggested for a follow-on
U.S./Russian workshop on sample return missions:
1. A topic that would be of interest at such a workshop would be an evaluation of recent
information regarding transfer of planetary fragments between Mars and Earth, and how this would
affect concepts of planetary cross contamination. Such studies would also be of great interest and
value in interpreting information from meteorites concerning the physical and chemical processes
operating during the early evolution of the solar system.
2. Another topic of interest would be the research and technology developments necessary for
return of a sample from Mars. Specifically, such developments include aseptic Mars sample transfer
technology, remote spacecraft exterior surface decontamination techniques, sample containment and
preservation technology, etc. Collaborative efforts between the U.S. and Russia would be extremely
useful in defining many of these technology needs.
3. It is highly likely that the methods and protocols that would be used for quarantine analyses
of returned Mars samples today would be quite different from those used in the past for returned
lunar samples. A joint effort to discuss and define these techniques would be most valuable.
18
APPENDIX 1
ATTENDEES AND PARTICIPANTS
Ms. Sara E. Acevedo
(Co-Organizer)
MS 245-1
NASA Ames Research Center
MoffettField CA 94035-1000
USA
Dr. Vasily Bogomolov
Babakin Space Research Center
Leningradskaya ul. 24, 24A
141400 Khimki-2
Moscow Obl
RUSSIA
Dr. Carl Bruch
53 Glen Edge Road
White Bear Lake MN 55110
USA
Mr. George Bulow
(Interpreter)
2593 Cowper Street
Palo Alto CA 94301
USA
Dr. J. Cantrell
Space Dynamics Lab
Utah State University
Logan UT 84322
USA
Dr. Benton Clark
Planetary Sciences Laboratory (0560)
Martin Marietta Aerospace
PO Box 179
Denver CO 80201
USA
Mr. Leo Daspit
Harbour Centre Bldg
2 Eaton Street Suite 1000
Hampton VA 23669
USA
Dr. Andr6 Debus
Service BA/AM
CNES
18 Ave Belin
31055 Toulouse
FRANCE
Dr. David J. Des Marais
MS 239-4
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field CA 94035-1000
USA
Dr. Donald L. DeVincenzi
(Co-Chairperson)
MS 245-1
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field CA 94035-1000
USA
Dr. Larry I. Hochstein
MS 239-4
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field CA 94035-1000
USA
Mr. Robert Howell
(Co-Organizer)
Biotrack Corporation
1059 Huff Avenue
Mountain View CA 94043
USA
19
Acad.Mikhail Ivanov
(Co-Chairperson)
RussianAcademyof Sciences
Institutefor Microbiology
Moscow V71
RUSSIA
Dr. HaroldP. Klein
SantaClaraUniversity
Biology Department
SantaClara CA 95050
USA
Dr. RoccoMancinelli
MS 239-12
NASA AmesResearchCenter
MoffettField CA 94035-1000
USA
Dr. ThomasMates
Director,InternationalBusiness
Development
SteriGenicsInternational
4020ClipperCourt
Fremont CA 94538
USA
Dr. JohnMcNamee
MS 171-225
JetPropulsionLaboratory
4800OakGroveDrive
PasadenaCA 91109
USA
Dr. MichaelMeyer
LockheedESC
Suite800
500E Street SW
WashingtonDC 20024
USA
20
Dr. LevMukhin
Councellorfor ScienceandTechnology
Embassyof theRussianFederation
112516thStreet NW
WashingtonDC 20036
USA
Dr. MargaretRace
Director
BotanicalGardens
CentennialDrive
Universityof California
Berkeley CA 94720
USA
Dr. JohnRummel
CodeSB
NASA Headquarters
IndependenceSquare1
300E Street SW
WashingtonDC 20546
USA
Dr. JosetteRunavot
CNES
CentreSpatialdeToulouse
18AvenueEdouard-Belin
31055ToulouseCedex
FRANCE
Mr. PerryStabekis
LockheedESC
Suite800
500E Street SW
WashingtonDC 20024
USA
Dr. VladislavTrofimov
NPOBiotechnologia
Scientific-IndustrialAssociation
NauchnyProezd8
Moscow 117246
RUSSIA
Ms. GalinaTverskaya
(Interpreter)
1709ShattuckAvenue #209
Berkeley CA 94704
USA
Dr. RichardYoung
Mail CodeMD-RES
NASA
KennedySpaceCenter FL
USA
32899
Dr. AlexanderVictorov
Instituteof BiomedicalProblems
76A KhoroshevskoeSchosse
D-7 Moscow 127007
RUSSIA
21

APPENDIX 2
WORKSHOP AGENDA
8:30 a.m.
9:00
9:30
10:00
10:30
11:00
11:30
12:00
1:00 p.m.
1:30
2:00
2:30
3:10
3:50
4:30
5:30
Monday, July 13, 1992
Introductions, Welcome, Logistics
Workshop Objectives and Products
Ancient Life/Chemical Evolution on Mars
Extant Life on Mars
Existing NASAJCOSPAR pp3 Policy
Space Studies Board Recommendations
Discussion - Scientific and Policy Issues
Lunch
PP Implementation for Viking Orbiters
PP Requirements for Mars Observer
Discussion - PP for Future Mars Orbiters
PP for Viking Landers
MESUR/Pathfinder Mission Design and PP Issues
PP Options for MESUR
Discussion - U.S. Mars Missions
Adjourn
Various
Ivanov and DeVincenzi
DesMarais
Ivanov
Rummel
Young
All
Daspit
Rummel
All
Daspit
McNamee
Howell
All
3planetary Protection. PRECE_i'_.i P;: :L,t: _-,LAI'_.4. ''"_,i.,_ FILMED
"_!; . il L,
8:30 a.m.
9:00
9:30
10:30
12:00 p.m.
12:30
1:30
5:30
Tuesday, July 14, 1992
Microbes and Spacecraft Components
Survey of Past Bioload Reduction Technology
Bioload Reduction Technology for Landers
Russian Mars 1994/1996 Missions and PP Hardware
Bioload Reduction Techniques for Mars 1994/1996
Lunch
Discussion - Recommendations for PP for Landers
with and without Life Detection; Recommendations
for New Research and Technology Development
Adjourn
Victorov
Stabekis
Trofimov
Bogomolov
Debus
All
8:30 a.m.
10:00
10:30
11:00
12:00
Wednesday, July 15, 1992
Development of Workshop Final Recommendations
Mars Sample Return Scientific/Technology Issues
Sample Return Nonscientific Issues
Topics for Sample Return Workshop
Adjourn
All
Klein
Race
All
24

Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE oM8No.o7o4-o188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gatheringand maintaining the data needed, end completing and reviewingthe collectionof information. Send comments regardingthis burden estimateor any other aspect of this
collection of information,includingsuggestionsfor reducingthis burden, to WashingtonHeadquarters Services,Directorate for informationOperations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork ReductionProject(0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
June 1993 Conference Publication
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Planetary Protection Implementation on Future Mars Lander Missions
6. AUTHOR(S)
R. Howell (Biotrack Corporation, Mountain View, CA)
and D. L. DeVincenzi
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCY NAME(S)AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
199-59-12-05
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
A-93085
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NASA CP-3216
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Point of Contact: D.L. DeVincenzi, Ames Research Center, MS 245-1, Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
(415) 604-5251
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified -- Unlimited
Subject Category 91
13.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
AB$ I HACT (Maximum 200 words)
A workshop was convened to discuss the subject of planetary protection implementation for Mars lander missions. It was sponsored and
organized by the Exobiology Implementation Team of the U.S./Russian Joint Working Group on Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems. The
objective of the workshop was to discuss planetary protection issues for the Russian Mars '94 mission, which is currently under development, as well
as for additional future Mars lander missions including the planned Mars '96 and U.S, MESUR Pathfinder and Network missions.
A series of invited presentations was made to ensure that workshop participants had access to information relevant to the planned discussions.
The topics summarized in this report include exobiology science objectives for Mars exploration, current international policy on planetary protection,
planetary protection requirements developed for earlier missions, mission plans and designs for future U.S. and Russian Mars landers, biological
contamination of spacecraft components, and techniques for spacecraft bioload reduction. In addition, the recent recommendations of the U.S. Space
Studies Board (SSB) on this subject were also summarized.
Much of the discussion focused on the recommendations of the SSB. The SSB proposed relaxing the planetary protection requirements for those
Mars lander missions that do not contaiaa life detection experiments, but maintaining Viking-like requirements for those missions that do contain life
detection experiments. The SSB recommendations were found to be acceptable as a guide for future missions, although many questions and concerns
about interpretation were raised and are summarized in this report. Significant among the concerns was the need for more quantitative guidelines to
prevent misinterpretation by project offices and better access to and use of the Viking data base of bioassays to specify microbial burden targets.
Among the questions raised were how will the SSB recommendations be integrated with existing Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) policy
and how will they apply to and affect Mars '94, Mars '96, MESUR Pathfinder, and MESUR Network missions?
One additional topic briefly considered at the workshop was the identification of some issues related to planetary protection considerations for
Mars sample return missions. These issues will form the basis for a follow-on joint U.S./Russian workshop on that subject.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Mars, Planetary protection, Exobiology, Spacecraft cleanliness
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
34
16. PRICE CODE
A03
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF ABSTRACT
i
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
